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Abstract
In this paper we use a variety of data sources, both micro and macro, time series, cross
section, and panel data to provide an empirical evaluation of the current level of economic
wellbeing of the Spanish elderly, and of its determinants. We focus, in particular on the role
played by the pension system and its generosity in terms of minimum pension supplements
and non-contributive pensions. In an IV context, we ¯nd that actual Social Security bene¯ts
contribute substantially to explain income and consumption poverty levels and trends of low
income and consumption percentiles. Thus we o®er support to previous evidence for Spain
emphasizing the role of minimum bene¯t policies.
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11 Introduction
Beginning in the late 1970s Spain has witnessed dramatic social, economic and demographic
changes. Life expectancy has increased substantially and fertility rates have dropped to some
of the lowest levels in the European Union. The Spanish public system of social insurance, of
which the public pension system (Seguridad Social) is the main component, underwent a major
reform in the middle 1980s and is now substantially more comprehensive and generous than it
used to be. Finally, Spanish per capita income has grown continuously since the middle 1980s, on
average at about a percentage point faster than the rest of the EU, and the di®erence has increased
since the late 1990s ; during the same period a large share of the older workers have been dismissed
and lead to retire earlier while the unemployment rate soared ¯rst and then, since 1996, declined
steadily to reach average European levels in the last three years.
In this chapter we document how the material well being of the Spanish elderly population
has been a®ected by this multidimensional process of economic and social change. Our conclusion
is that the elderly are remarkably better o® now than thirty years ago, indeed that their relative
wellbeing, vis-µ a-vis that of the rest of Spanish society, has increased dramatically and that, apart
for the general economic evolution, this is due mostly to changes in the public pension and welfare
system.
The rest of the document goes as follows. In section 2 we document the macroeconomic facts
during the last decades. In section 3 we describe the Social Security background. The data and
sources are commented in section 4. The wellbeing trends are shown in section 5. Sections 6 and 7
describe our methodology and section 8 present the main results from the analysis. Finally, section
9 o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Facts
2.1 Macroeconomic Evolution
Table 1 summarizes the Spanish macroeconomic evolution, in relation to the EU's average perfor-
mances, since 1975. The basic facts for Spain are as follows.1 In the period immediately after the
oil shock, 1975-1985, which coincides with the death of Francisco Franco and the beginning of the
democratic transition, both the growth rate of GDP and the level of employment are well below
the European average. This period corresponds to a dramatic \structural transition" in which a
few million jobs are eliminated and the unemployment rate skyrockets to levels substantially above
twenty percent. This was only partially a consequence of the two oil shocks; the collapse of the
Franco regime lead to a spontaneous and unplanned \opening" of the economy, which preceded
and anticipated the entrance into the EU of almost a decade. As a consequence of this broad
restructuring process, productivity growth in Spain was by far more intense than the European
average until the second half of the 1980s. In the period since 1985, the opposite process took place:
productivity growth in Spain is slightly but persistently below the EU average, while GDP and
employment grow, on average, faster than in the rest of Europe. The last ten years, in particular,
have seen a spectacular increase in Spanish employment (¯ve million additional jobs out of a total
employment, in 1995, of about twelve millions) which has, nevertheless, come together with a very
slow rate of growth in labor productivity. In°ation, on the other hand, has been slightly above the
European average during the whole period, although the di®erential has reduced in recent years,
1Source: Eurostat. See Dolado et al. (1998) for further details.following the implementation ¯rst of the Maastricht pact and then of the Euro. Finally, real unit
labor cost have been decreasing at about the EU average during the whole period.
Table 1: The Macroeconomic Scenario. (Annual percentage growth rates)
Spain EU
75-85 85-90 90-99 99-04 75-85 85-90 90-99 99-04
GDP real growth 1.7 4.5 2.3 2.9 2.3 3.2 1.8 2.2
Number employed -1.6 3.3 1.0 2.2 0.1 1.4 0.2 1.0
Average hours worked { -0.2 -0.2 -1.2 { -0.4 -0.3 -0.9
GDP/number emp. 3.3 1.2 1.3 { 2.2 1.7 1.6 {
GDP/total hours worked { 1.4 1.6 { { 2.1 1.9 {
Consumer prices 15.4 6.5 3.9 3.1 10.3 4.4 3.0 2.2
Average earnings 17.2 7.9 4.9 2.6 11.6 6.4 4.1 2.4
Average real earnings 1.6 1.4 0.9 { 1.2 1.9 1.1 {
Average real labor costs 2.1 0.5 0.6 3.2 1.5 1.4 1.1 2.8
Real unit labor cost -1.1 -0.7 -0.7 -1.0 -1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.1
What are the implications of these macroeconomic facts for our purposes? Basically that the
relative economic position of Spain, and of the average Spaniard, has improved substantially, vis-
¶ a-vis that of the average European, during the last thirty years. The natural question to ask,
therefore, is: did this improvement in the economic well being of the average Spaniard translate
also into an improvement of the economic conditions of the elderly? The next ¯gure reports the ratio
of pension expenditure to GDP since 1965. It is apparent that this ratio has grown substantially
for about thirty years and has °attened out and slightly decreased during the last ten years or so.
Is this dynamics of the pension/GDP ratio due only to demographic change or also to other
factors? As the next subsection brie°y shows, demographic change has been substantial in Spain,
still it cannot fully account for the dramatic increase of the pension expenditure to GDP ratio. In
the rest of the paper we try to identify the dimensions along which social policies have also made
a di®erence, how they have interacted with demographic change and along which dimensions this
interplay has a®ected the quality of life of Spanish elderly.
2.2 Demographic scenario
The three main factors determining the evolution of the size and composition of the population
are fertility, mortality, and migration. In the absence, so far, of important migration °ows2 it is
the interaction between fertility and mortality that determines both the size of the working age
population and its relation with the non-working age population (dependency ratios). In Table
2 we present estimates of the past (1950-2000) and projected (2000-2020) trends for the Spanish
population. We report the size of the three main age-groups, which implicitly de¯ne dependency
2Things have rapidly be changing during the last ¯ve or eight years. The previously invisible °ow of immigrants
into Spain, has now become quite visible: we estimate there are about 3 million immigrants in Spain, out of a
total population slightly less than 43 million. Very recent (2005) administrative and legislative changes, aimed at
facilitating the admission of foreign workers and regularizing the position of about 800 thousands of them, may lead
to an even more dramatic upsurge in the migration °ow.
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ratios, the synthetic fertility index (SFI), and the life expectancy at birth and at 65 for the two
sexes separately.
In Spain, the overall dependency ratio (share of the inactive population over the active) has
increased continuously since the late 1950s, but the reason for the increase has changed somewhere
in the middle of the period. The fraction of the young, [0-14], in the population peaked in the 1970s
and steadily decreased since. Currently, the size of each newborn generation is half the size of the
same generation twenty years ago. Instead, the fraction of people who are 65+ has grown steadily
since the 1950s, has doubled by now and is expected to increase further in the future until it triples
in 2020 and then almost quadruple by 2050. This is due to the cumulation of two factors: the high
fertility rates of the 1950s, and the steady increase in life expectancy at 65. While the baby boom
"wave e®ect" is temporary and will be gone by 2035-2040, the increase in life expectancy is widely
believed to continue during the forthcoming decades; as a consequence, by 2050, life expectancy at
65 may be 5 to 7 years longer than it is now for either sex.
The observation made in the previous footnote about the dramatic upsurge of immigration since
1999-2000, gives us a measure of how biased the demographic picture of Table 2, which is based on
o±cial data available in 2002-2003, actually is. As mentioned, the current resident population of
Spain is of about 43 million people, hence the table misses slightly less than 3 million people. These
are all immigrants and, while they may not all belong to the central age group, plenty of informal
evidence suggests most of them do, implying that the actual dependency ratio in Spain is, currently,
substantially lower than the one reported in Table 2. Uno±cial data from the Ministry of Labor
and Welfare put the number of immigrants in the working age group at 2.357.056 as of January
2005. These facts make the forecasts of doom coming out of standard demographic exercises hard
to accept, and will require a more serious re-examination of the whole problem when better and
more systematic data will become available.
One thing, in particular, we do not know is what the fertility rate is among immigrants and how
it is evolving. Again, unsystematic evidence suggests much higher fertility rates among immigrants
3Table 2: The Spanish demographic scenario.
Life expectancy
Population structure SFI at 0 at 65
Year Total 0-14 15-64 65+ M F M F
000's % % %
1950 27493 26.23 66.54 7.23 | 59.8 64.3 11.8 13.5
1960 30070 27.30 64.20 8.40 2.86 67.4 72.2 12.5 14.3
1970 34041 27.79 62.54 9.67 2.99 69.2 74.7 13.3 15.9
1981 37683 25.70 63.06 11.24 2.20 70.4 16.2 13.6 16.4
1991 38872 18.63 67.43 13.94 1.34 73.4 80.5 15.5 19.2
1996 39670 15.81 68.54 15.65 1.16 74.3 81.6 16.0 20.1
2000 40122 14.58 68.54 16.88 1.15 75.3 82.4 16.5 20.8
2010 40359 13.13 68.73 18.14 1.22 76.8 83.8 | |
2020 43378 11.16 68.23 20.61 1.31 78.0 84.8 | |
Source: INE, www.fedea.es, and U.S. Bureau of the Census.
than among Spanish citizens, but what remains unclear is the speed at which the fertility patterns
of the former will converge to those of the latter. As a matter of fact, Spanish fertility rates
have fallen so rapidly and dramatically since 1977 that, in spite of the documented increase in life
expectancy, forward projections of current trends (excluding immigration) forecast an important
decline of the population by 2050. Under this fertility scenarios, Spanish population is projected
to start declining by the year 2020. In 1965, the Spanish synthetic fertility index (SFI) reached
the peak of its post civil war recovery, at almost 3.0 children per woman (well above the European
average at the time). It remained relatively stable for more than a decade, until 1976, when it
suddenly started declining to reach 1.16 in year 2000 (second lowest in Europe, after Italy). This
amounts to a reduction of practically two children per woman in about a generation. In the last
three years, the fertility rate of Spanish women has given signs of recovery, it currently stands
at 1.35, which is still very low by most standards and certainly unable to prevent the forecasted
population decline.
This fertility reduction has been paralleled by an increase in both prime age female labor force
participation and educational attainment of Spanish women; the latter change has been dramatic:
only in 1981 the share of people older than 16 with a completed college degree was 6:4% for men
and 4:5% for women, while in the 2001 Census those percentages are 13:2% and 13:9% respectively.
In 1977 the fraction of 25 years old women with tertiary education was 6.4 percent, this fraction
reached 24.6 percent in 1995 and 34.2 in 2000. During the same period (1977-95) the increase in the
labor force participation rates (LFPR) of women 16-64 has been modest compared to most OECD
countries (from 32.6 to 46.0 percent). Since 1995 the increase has accelerated and the participation
rate of women has reached now 51.6 percent; given that it is already above 80.0 percent for women
with tertiary education or higher, it is reasonable to forecast that it will keep increasing sharply
for the next two decades or so. With regard to the LFPR of married women, the increase has been
spectacular, from 21.4 percent in 1977 to 40.8 in 1995 and 46.6 percent in 2000. The ¯gures for
married adult women (25-54) are even higher: from 22.2 in 1977 to 54.5 in 2000. In summary, for
prime age women (25-54), the LFPR (employment in brackets) between 1977 and 2000 has gone
4from 29.1 (28.6) per cent to 62.3 (50.6) per cent.
In the light of the very recent trends for SFI and immigration °ows, then, the population pro-
jections mentioned earlier are likely to be biased downward. The immigration factor, in particular,
cannot be ignored even in the short and medium run. Migration has always been an important
demographic factor for Spain, but the sign of the °ow has reversed: Spaniards are no longer emi-
grating, instead people, mostly from North Africa and Latin America but also from poorer Eastern
European countries, are immigrating into Spain. However, and in spite of the substantial °ow of
illegal immigrants, that some estimate at around 350-400 thousands individuals a year, until the
current year the Spanish socio-political environment did not appear ready to adopt policies favor-
ing immigration and allowing a legalization of those already working in the country. After about
ten years of legislative passivity, in front of a continuously mounting °ow of illegal immigrants,
this policy choice has very recently been reversed. The e®ects on the social security system will
probably be rapidly visible.
The Spanish labor force survey (Encuesta de Poblaci¶ on Activa, or EPA) provides an alternative
source of data about Spanish immigration. While in 1977-1980 the fraction of people born abroad
among those interviewed in EPA was 0.31 percent, in 1998-2000 this fraction had increased to
above 1.00 percent; in the same years, the Social Security a±liation ¯les suggested that foreigners
represent about 3.0 percent of the legal workforce. While pointing in the correct direction, these
are still substantial underestimates: our back of the envelope calculations suggest that foreign
immigrants may account, as of 2005, for about 10 to 15% of the Spanish work force. Furthermore,
while, in 1977-1980 the male labor force participation rate of people born abroad (64 percent)
was well below the Spanish male average (74 per cent), in recent years, the situation has reversed
and the labor force participation of men born abroad is 11 percentage points higher than that of
Spaniards (74.1 against 63.0).
In the face of this data and of the rapidly mutating political approach foreign workers, taking
a stance on the future evolution of immigration into Spain and of its impact on the Spanish labor
force appears di±cult. It is our belief, nevertheless, that the very recent trends are likely to be
sustained and that the earlier forecasts of a decreasing population starting in 2020 are most likely
to be contradicted.
3 Background on the Spanish Social Security System
3.1 History
Mandatory insurance for job related accidents was introduced in 1900, through a bill that also
authorized the creation of some funds, for public employees only, paying disability and retirement
pensions. In 1919, mandatory retirement insurance (Retiro Obrero Obligatorio) was introduced for
private sector employees aged 16{65 whose total annual salary was below a certain threshold. In
1926, a universal pension system for public employees (R¶ egimen de Clases Pasivas, or RCP) was
established, which still exists under the same name. By the late 1930s, most Spanish employees
were covered, in one form or another, by some minimal, government mandated retirement insurance
program.
With the end of the Republic and the advent of Franco's regime, a number of changes were
implemented. In 1939, Workers' Retirement (Retiro Obrero) was replaced by Old Age Insurance
(Seguro de Vejez). While the former was based upon a capitalization system, the latter was from
the beginning a completely unfunded pay-as-you-go scheme. By 1950, the system had acquired its
basic organization in two pillars, which remained essentially unchanged until the mid 1970s. Public
5servants were all covered by the RCP, while private sector employees with annual earnings below
a certain ceiling were covered by the Old Age Insurance. The 1963 reform created a very large
number of special funds (Reg¶ ³menes Especiales) next to the general scheme (R¶ egimen General),
generating a jungle of special treatments which is still being dismantled.
In 1977, a reform bill made a ¯rst attempt at harmonizing the many existing funds, by reducing
the di®erences in the treatment they o®ered and by putting (in 1979) the administration of the
whole system under the newly created National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de la
Seguridad Social, or INSS). Overall, this process increased the percentage of workers covered by
the public SS system.
3.2 Rules of the System
3.3 The 1985 Reform and the Current System
The key rules before the 1985 reform (see Barrada (1999) for a complete description) were the
following:
1. The Normal Retirement Age is set at 65 and the Early Retirement Age, for those that started
contributing before 1967, at 60.
2. Elegibility: 10 years of contributions, of which 2 years should be in the last seven years
preceding the date of retirement.
3. Amount of pension: 50% of the \bene¯t base" with 10 years of contributions, plus 2% for
each additional year of contributions, up to 100% with 35 years.
The reform process, which came to shape the current regime, introduced a few important
changes: Eligibility criteria for disability pensions were tightened; the minimum number of years
of contributions required to obtain an old-age pension was increased from 8 to 15; and the number
of years entering the computation of the bene¯t base was increased from 2 to 8. On June 26, 1997,
many of the parameters used for the computation of bene¯t bases and pensions were modi¯ed. The
number of contributive years over which the bene¯t base is computed was increased from 8 to 15
(by year 2001). The formula for the computation of the replacement rate ® (see below) was also
made less generous, whereas the 8% per-year penalty applied to early retirees between the ages of
60 and 65 was reduced to 7% for those individuals with 40 or more contributive years at the time
of retirement.
Currently, the Spanish Social Security o®ers two pathways to regular retirement3: early retire-
ment and normal retirement. Early retirement is possible starting at age 60, while the normal
retirement age is 65, although some professional groups have lower normal retirement ages (miners,
military personnel, policemen and ¯shermen are the main ones). Collective wage settlements often
impose mandatory retirement at age 65, facilitate retirement at 64 with full bene¯ts, or encourage
retirement between 60 and 63 through lump sum payments.
Public pensions are provided by the following programs.
² The \General Social Security Scheme" (R¶ egimen General de la Seguridad Social, or RGSS)
and the \Special Social Security Schemes for Self-employed" (R¶ egimen Especial de Traba-
jadores Aut¶ onomos or RETA). They cover, respectively, the private sector employees and the
3That is to say, in the absence of disability or long term unemployment in late age.
6self-employed workers and professionals. The RGSS covers also the members of cooperative
¯rms, the employees of most public administrations other than the central governments and
all unemployed individuals complying with the minimum number of contributory years when
reaching 65.
² The scheme for government employees (R¶ egimen de Clases Pasivas, or RCP) includes public
servants employed by the central government and its local branches.
3.4 Rules of the RGSS
This subsection describes the rules governing, since 1985, the old-age and survivors pensions in the
RGSS. The changes introduced by the 1997 reform (R97) and the 2002 (A02) amendment will be
illustrated as we go along. A summary of the basic technical aspects of the pre- and post-1997
systems can be found in Table 3.
Financing and Eligibility
The RGSS is a pure pay-as-you-go scheme. Contributions are a ¯xed proportion of covered earnings,
de¯ned as total earnings, excluding payments for overtime work, between a °oor and a ceiling that
vary by broadly de¯ned professional categories. Currently, eleven categories are distinguished, each
one with its own ceiling and °oor for covered earnings. The current RGSS contribution rate is 28.3
percent, of which 23.6 percent is attributed to the employer and the remaining 4.7 percent to the
employee. A tax rate of 14 percent is levied on earnings from overtime work.
Entitlement to an old-age pension requires at least 15 years of contributions. As a general rule,
recipiency is conditional on having reached age 65 and is incompatible with income from any kind
of employment requiring a±liation to the Social Security system.
Bene¯t computation
When eligibility conditions are met, a retiring worker receives an initial monthly pension Pt equal
to
Pt = ®n BRt;
where the bene¯t base (base reguladora) BRt is a weighted average of covered monthly earnings
















where Wt¡j and It¡j are earnings and the consumer price index in the j-th month before retirement.
Pensions are paid in fourteen annual installments, hence the division by 112 in the previous formula.
The replacement rate ®n depends on the age of the retirees and on the number of years of






0; if n < 15;
:6 + :02(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 35;
1; if 35 · n:
7In the case of early retirement, i.e. for ages between 60 and 65, ®n is determined by the previous
formula multiplied a penalization factor. The latter is equal to :60 at 60, and increases of :08 each
year, until reaching the value of 1:0 at age 65.
Beginning in 1997, the number of reference years used for computing BRt has been increased
by one every year until 2003, to reach a total of 15 years. The formula for computing ®n has been
changed to the following
®n =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0; if n < 15;
:5 + :03(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 25;
:8 + :02(n ¡ 25); if 25 · n < 35;
1; if 35 · n:
The penalization factors have, basically, remained the same, exception made for workers with
40 or more years of contributions (details in the next subsection).
The A02 amendment allows for the possibility of ®n being greater that one when people are
above 65 years of age, that is
®n =
n
1 + :02(a ¡ 65); if 65 · a and n ¸ 35;
Outstanding pensions are fully indexed to price in°ation, as measured by the consumer price
index. Until 1986, pensions were also indexed to real wage growth.
Early retirement
The normal retirement age is 65 but early retirement at age 60 is permitted under fairly common
circumstances. The replacement rate for early retirees is reduced by 8 percentage points for each
year under age 65. Starting from 1997, workers who retires after the age of 60 with 40 or more
contributive years are charged a penalty of only 7 percent for each year under age 65. The 2002





0; if a < 61;
1 ¡ ·(a ¡ 60); if 61 · a < 65;




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0:08 if n = 30;
0:075 if 31 · n · 34;
0:07 if 35 · n ·< 37;
0:065 if 38 · n ·< 39;
0:06 if 40 · n:
Unless a collective labor agreement prescribes mandatory retirement, individuals may continue
working after age 65. Before 2002 there were no incentives to work past age 65. As mentioned, the
2002 legislation now allows for
®n =
n
1 + :02(a ¡ 65); if 65 · a and n ¸ 35;
8and eliminates social security contributions for workers meeting the eligibility criteria for full normal
retirement (a ¸ 65 and n ¸ 35) and who continue working. About ten percent of the workers
enrolled in the RGSS is actually exempt from reduction in the replacement rate in case of early
retirement.
Maximum and minimum pension
Pensions are subject to a ceiling, legislated annually and roughly equal to the ceiling on covered
earnings. The 2000 ceiling corresponds to about 4.3 times the minimum wage (salario m¶ ³nimo
interprofesional, or SMI) and about 1.6 times the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing
and service sectors. If the initial old-age pension, computed as above, is below a minimum, then
the minimum pension is paid. The latter is also legislated annually. Other things being equal,
minimum pensions are higher for those who are older than 65 or have a dependent spouse.
In the last decade, minimum pensions grew at about the same rate as nominal wages, whereas
maximum pensions grew at the rate of in°ation. The ratio between the minimum old-age pension
and the minimum wage has been increasing steadily from the late 1970s (it was 75 percent in 1975)
until reaching almost 100 percent in the early 1990s. The percentage of RGSS retirees receiving a
minimum pension has been declining steadily, from over 75 percent in the late 1970s to 27 percent
in 1995.
Family considerations
A pensioner receives a ¯xed annual allowance for each dependent child that is younger than 18 or
disabled. In 2000, this allowance was equal to 48,420 pesetas (or 291 euros) for each child under
18, and to 468,720 pesetas (2817 euros or 45 percent of the annualized minimum wage) for each
disabled child.
Survivors (spouse, children, other relatives) may receive a fraction of the bene¯t base of the
deceased if the latter was a pensioner or died before retirement after contributing for at least 500
days in the last 5 years. The surviving spouse gets 45 percent of the bene¯t base of the deceased (46
percent after the 2002 amendment, fraction that will be increased further in the forthcoming years).
Such pension is compatible with labor income and any other old-age or disability pension, but is
lost if the spouse marries anew. Each of the surviving children gets 20 percent of the bene¯t base
until the age of 18 (amount raised to 23 per cent in 1997). An orphan who is the sole bene¯ciary
may receive up to 65 percent of the bene¯t base. If there are several surviving children, the sum
of the pensions to the surviving spouse (if any) and the children cannot exceed 100 percent of the
bene¯t base.
A Spanish peculiarity is the \pension in favor of family members". This pension entitles other
surviving relatives (e.g. parents, grandparents, siblings, nephews, etc.) to 20 percent of the bene¯t
base of the principal if they satisfy certain eligibility conditions (older than 45, do not have a
spouse, do not have other means of subsistence, have been living with and depending economically
upon the deceased for the last two years). To this pension, one may add the 45 percent survivors
pension if there is no surviving spouse or eligible surviving children.
Rules for the self-employed
In this section we sketch the main di®erences between the RGSS and the RETA. Beside di®erences
in the SS tax rate and the de¯nition of covered earnings, the people a±liated to RETA and who
are not miners or sailors have no early retirement option .
9While the SS tax rate is the same for the RETA and the general scheme (28.3 percent in 2000),
covered earnings are computed di®erently, as the self-employed are essentially free to choose their
covered earnings between a °oor and a ceiling legislated annually. Not surprisingly in the light
of the strong progressivity of Spanish personal income taxes, a suspiciously large proportion of
self-employed workers report earnings equal to the legislated °oor until they reach about age 50
to 55. After that age one observes a sudden increase in reported covered earnings. This behavior
exploits the \¯nite memory" in the formula for the calculation of the initial pension and appears
to be fading after the 1997 legislation increased the number of years used in that calculation from
eight to ¯fteen.
A crucial di®erence with respect to the general scheme is that, under the RETA, recipiency of
an old-age pension is compatible with maintaining the self-employed status. Other important pro-
visions are the following: RETA only requires 5 years of contributions in the 10 years immediately
before the death of the principal in order to qualify for survivors pensions. Under RETA, the latter
is 50 percent of the bene¯t base. If the principal was not a pensioner at the time of death, the
bene¯t base is computed as the average of covered earnings over an uninterrupted period of 5 years
chosen by the bene¯ciary among the last 10 years before the death of the principal.
Rules for central government employees (RCP)
We now describe brie°y the main di®erences between the general scheme and the RCP, the pension
fund for the employees of the central government. Public servants are divided into 5 categories,
labelled from A to E, corresponding loosely to decreasing school levels: A for college graduates, B
for people holding certain kinds of college diplomas, C for high school graduates, D for junior high
school diplomas, and E for individuals with lower education levels. For each of these categories,
the budget law de¯nes every year a theoretical SS wage, which is used to compute SS contributions
and pensions. The implied wage scale has remained relatively constant since 1985. The top to
bottom ratio never exceeded 2.5.
The basic monthly pension of a public servant who retires in month t after contributing for n
years to RCP is computed as Pt = ®n BRt, where the dependence of ®n upon the numbers of years
worked has changed frequently over time. For n ¸ 15, the last table of proportionality factors,
legislated in 1990, can be reasonably (but not exactly) approximated by
®n = min(1; 1 ¡ :0366(35 ¡ n)):
The di®erences with respect to the general scheme are various. First, while the entitlement to
a pension still requires at least 15 years of contributions, the replacement rate (the ratio of the
pension to the bene¯t base) increases somewhat irregularly with seniority, up to 100 percent after
35 years. So, for example, 15 years of service give right to a pension equal to only 26.92 percent
of the bene¯t base, against 60 percent of the general scheme. After 30 years the same ratio has
increased to 81.73 percent, against 90 percent for the general scheme.
Second, the bene¯t base is computed as a weighted average of covered earnings upon which the






where pi is the fraction of the career spent on leveli and Hit are the covered earnings corresponding
to level i, as determined by the current law at time t.
10Table 3: Pension provisions, institutions and systems
RGSS System RGSS System
Institutions 1985{1996 after 1997
Provisions a®ecting all individuals
A. Basic ingredients

























{Contribution period 8 years 15
{Fraction actualized 6 years 13
A2. Fiscal system
{income tax [progressive] id.
{labor tax linear (regime and group speci¯c) id.
B. Replacement rates




0; if n < 15;
:6 + :02(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 35;
1; if 35 · n:
8
> > > <
> > > :
0; if n < 15;
:5 + :03(n ¡ 15); if 15 · n < 25;
:8 + :02(n ¡ 25); if 25 · n < 35;
1; if 35 · n:
- Function of age exception for n ¸ 40: 8
> <
> :
0; if a < 60;
:6 + :8(a ¡ 60); if 60 · a < 65;




0; if a < 60;
:65 + :07(a ¡ 60); if 60 · a < 65;
1; if 65 · a:
Provisions a®ecting some individuals
C. Income tax exemptions
{maximum pension exempted / Minimum wages id.
{maximum income exempted / Minimum wages id.
D. Min/Max contributions
{Min. level of contribution (speci¯c for 12 group) id.
{Max. level of contribution (speci¯c for 12 group) id.
E. Min. and Max. pensions
{Minimum pension / Minimum wages and family speci¯c id.
{Maximum pension 4.3 minimum wage (in 1995) id.
F. Age bonuses YES (occupation speci¯c) id
G. Survivor bene¯ts 0:45 £ (bene¯t base) id
H. Dependant bene¯ts 18, 22 (means tested) 18, 23 (means tested)
Eligibility 2 years contrib. last 10 years 2 out of last 15 years
Pension computation bt = maxfminf~ bt[n;e;BR(BC;I)]; btg; btg
where ~ bt is the pension in A+B and
bt and bt are respectively the maximum and minimum pension.
2002 Amendment




0; if a < 61;
1 ¡ ·(a ¡ 60) if 61 · a < 65;
1 if 65 · a:
where · =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0:08 if n = 30
0:075 if 31 · n · 34
0:07 if 35 · n ·< 37
0:065 if 38 · n ·< 39
0:06 if 40 · n:
-Premium for late retirement ®n = 1 + 0:02(a ¡ 65)if n ¸ 30
-Social Security contributions: No contributions for workers 65+, provided n ¸ 35
-Survivor bene¯ts 0:46 £ (bene¯t base)
11Third, unlike the general scheme, the RCP imposes mandatory retirement at age 65. Exception
are made for a few special categories, such as university professors and judges. On the other hand,
the RCP allows for early retirement at the age of 60, without any penalty for public servants with
at least 30 years of service (20 for military personnel).
A fourth important di®erence with respect to the general scheme is compatibility between RCP
pensions recipiency and income from continuing to work. In a number of special cases, RCP
pensioners are allowed to keep a public sector occupation, as long as this does not provide them
with a \regular °ow of income" (for example, this is the case of members of legislative bodies). More
importantly, the legislation allows RCP pensions to be cumulated with earnings from employment
in the private sector.
4 Description of Data and sources
We start by providing an index of the data set that are currently available. One important limitation
should be noticed: there is no single data set covering the whole period 1975-2005. Most time series,
therefore, will be constructed by splining data from di®erent sources, creating obvious problems of
consistency, which, while less dramatic than one might expect, are nevertheless substantial.
² Income data. We draw information about the level, distribution and sources of income from
four micro data sources
1. The European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a longitudinal survey covering
7000 households during 1994-2001
2. The Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares 1985 (ECPF 85), a rotating panel
of 3000 households, covering the period 1985-1996.
3. The Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares 1997 (ECPF 97), a rotating panel
of 8000 households, from 1997 to the current days.
4. A set of historical data on individual pensions, from the archives of the Spanish Social
Security Administration, covering about 250 thousands workers and pensioners during
the decade 1988-1998 (HLSS 1998; see Boldrin et al (2004) for more details).
² Consumption and household's income. We have access to three sets of microeconomic data
containing information about individual and households' consumption.
1. The Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares 1985 (ECPF 85), a rotating panel
of 3000 households, covering the period 1985-1996.
2. The Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares 1997 (ECPF 97), a rotating panel
of 8000 households, from 1997 to the current days.
3. The Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF), a cross-sectional survey carried out
during the years 1973-1974, 1980-1981 and 1990-1991, over sample of households of
varying magnitudes (the largest one, 1990-1991, covered about 21,500 households for a
total of about 77,000 individuals).
² Employment. Data about employment and labor force participation come from the Encuesta
de Poblaci¶ on Activa(EPA), a rotating quarterly panel survey started in 1976 and continuing
to these days.
12Table 4: Variables and Data Sources
Measure Source Period Ages Obs. (000s)
Bene¯ts HLSS 1998 all ages 85
Income EPF 80{81 60{75+ 107
Income ECPF 85{97 60{75+ 247
Income ECHP 94{01 60{75+ 123
Consumption EPF 80-81 60{75+ 107
Consumption ECPF 85{97 60{75+ 247
Consumptiona ECPF 97{01 60{75+ +400
Life satisfaction EB 85{02 60{75+ 17
Health Status ES 85{87,93 60{75+ 123.1
Health Status ECHP 94{01 60{75+ 123
² Life Satisfaction. Few sources of information are available here, none highly reliable or based
upon an extensive sample. We use the answers to a few speci¯c questions in small and
irregular sociological surveys carried out by CIS and by Eurobarometer (EB) during the
period 1985{2002.
² Health Status. Information about health status comes from three di®erent sources.
1. The ECHP contains a few variables measuring both health status and personal usage of
health care services.
2. The Encuestas de Salud (ES) carried out in 1985-1987, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1999, and 2001.
3. The Disability, Impairment and Health Status Survey (DIHSS), which was carried out
in 1999, and covered 79,000 households for a total of 220,000 people.
² Wealth. We have no reliable sources of data about wealth distribution and its composition at
the individual or household levels. In recent years, the Bank of Spain has launched a survey
to study consumer's ¯nances. However it does not overlap with our period of study.
The information about data availability, sources, and period of time covered is summarized in
Table 4
5 Well-Being of the elderly over time
5.1 Income and Consumption Measures
The ¯rst set of questions we ask is concerned with the income of the elderly, its level, sources,
distribution, and dynamics in relation to that of the average national income. To provide a bench-
mark against which to evaluate performances we present ¯rst some evidence relative to the whole
population. Table 5 reports, from various and not homogeneous sources, a number of measures of
earning and consumption expenditure. For each variable we report both per capita and household
averages; the variable considered are, from left to right, food expenditure, total consumption ex-
penditure, and total earnings; the last column reports the average household size. Three sources
of data are used, the EPF 73{74 and 80{81 and the ECPF 85, which explains the discontinuities
13Table 5: Income and consumption expenditure. 2002 Euros
Food Total Cons. Earnings Family
Year per capita OECD scale per capita OECD scale per capita OECD scale size
73 1679.60 2307.26 4834.67 6641.37 3995.94 5489.21 3.73
81 1420.79 1953.38 4730.15 6503.28 4133.95 5683.59 3.70
85 913.07 1239.23 4950.23 6718.55 4081.43 5539.39 3.65
86 899.96 1217.36 4788.70 6477.60 4102.30 5549.12 3.59
87 954.66 1284.02 5138.60 6911.43 4358.56 5862.28 3.55
88 896.39 1203.23 5135.04 6892.82 4609.43 6187.29 3.52
89 915.98 1227.26 5475.40 7336.12 4944.44 6624.72 3.51
90 942.72 1255.32 5816.09 7744.73 5303.33 7061.94 3.42
91 915.47 1213.84 6046.21 8016.81 5579.07 7397.41 3.39
92 921.37 1216.58 6314.55 8337.72 5843.66 7715.95 3.31
93 878.07 1157.43 6368.98 8395.28 5987.34 7892.23 3.25
94 886.71 1168.06 6370.27 8391.50 5951.37 7839.68 3.26
95 875.98 1151.88 6259.68 8231.24 6020.09 7916.19 3.26
96 875.49 1148.12 6153.61 8069.88 6060.37 7947.60 3.22
97
98
¤ 1159.76 1517.66 6184.16 8092.59 | | 3.24
99
¤ 1157.99 1508.03 6385.71 8316.07 | | 3.16
00
¤ 1220.07 1583.55 6838.07 8875.22 | | 3.09
01
¤ 1249.03 1617.15 7071.15 9155.14 | | 3.03
02
¤ 1243.00 1605.60 6985.08 9022.92 | | 3.00
Sources: EPF 73{74, 80{81; ECPF 85{02
in the reported levels of food expenditure between 1981 and 1985, and 1996 and 1998. Leaving
this aside, and ignoring the amusing fact that in Spain reported income is always and substantially
lower than reported consumption expenditure, two facts should be appreciated: the drop in average
household size from almost 4 individuals in 1973 to 3 in 2002, and the close to 40% increase in real
per capita consumption expenditure over the 1985{2002 period. This number looks surprisingly
large when compared to the average growth rate of per capita real earnings over the same period
(Table 1), which is barely at one percent per year.
Did Spanish pensions keep up with the growth in real personal earnings of the population at
large? Figure 2 reports the behavior of per capita real bene¯ts during 1980{2000, both in absolute
value and in relation to mean income, for men and women respectively. Bene¯ts have grown
dramatically in relation to mean income, from 34 to about 60-65 percent in just twenty years, while
real per capita bene¯ts more than doubled during the period. Notice that, both in absolute value
and in relation to mean income, the two ratios are practically identical; interestingly: the one for
males was lower than the one for females in 1980, when one would have expected the opposite
in the light of the shorter working lifes of women. The evolution since 1995 is interesting, as
it suggests that a substantial part of the °attening of the pension expenditure to GDP ratio we
illustrated earlier on, is attributable to a growth rate of bene¯ts lower than the growth rate of per
capita national income. The drop in the ratio of bene¯ts to mean income appears to be stronger
for women. Overall the ¯gure suggests an extremely rapid growth in per capita pension bene¯ts
until year 1997, after which pension bene¯ts still grow but at a much lower pace than wages and
earnings.
Social security bene¯ts make up for the bulk of personal income among Spanish people aged
60 years or more, as Figure 3 illustrates; very little is left, especially after the age of 65, for labor
earnings and capital income.
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15Figure 3: Distribution of personal income sources by sex and age group. source: ECHP.
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The same is true also when households are taken as units of measurement, as shown in Figure
4. Looking at this data and at the labor force participation rates of the elderly (see ¯gure 5) one
cannot resist speculating that the continuous increase (and then stagnation) in the ratio between
pension bene¯ts and average income reported in Figure 2 may have been the main driving force
behind the reduction in the level of employment of Spanish people 60+, and its very recent, and
very small, rebound. The four panels show that labor force participation and employment declined
steadily and dramatically until 1997-1998, at which point the trend reversed. The reversal is clearly
due to a change in the patterns of early retirement (60 to 64) as the two top panels show. The
remarkable correlation between the behavior of the LFPR for this age group and the behavior of
(approximately) the replacement ratio reported in Figure 2 suggest that some form of causation
is most certainly at work here even if one should not underplay the \retention" role that the
particularly buoyant labor market of the 1996-2004 period may have played in keeping older people
from retirement. Either way, these ¯gures are a dramatic proof that the labor supply of the elderly
is not as inelastic as many assume, and that the employment rate of people older than 60 increase
when their market wages increase faster than the retirement bene¯ts.
To further assess the level and time trend of the initial replacement rate for perspective retirees,
Figure 6 reports the average initial pension (in real Euros of year 2002) for the three main categories
of retirees. The source of the data used here and in Figure 7 is the HLSS 98 sample, which is drawn
in an unbalanced form from the SS bene¯ts ¯le. The overall increasing trend is clearly visible, even
if the wide swing in the initial relative pension of people retiring at 60 requires explanation (see
below). The average annual growth rate of the initial pension at 65 during the 1980{1998 period is
equal to 2.3 percent, which is twice the growth rate of real earnings over the 1980-2000 period (see
Table 1). In other words, the real value of initial pensions has increased by more than 60 percent
in 20 years. The drop in the real value of initial pensions for the early retirees group, which is
visible during the 1985-1990 period, is most likely attributable to the change in the bene¯t base
formula (increased from 2 to 8 years) and the extraordinary use made during those years of the
early retirement provision as an extension of unemployment insurance for old workers. A large
number of old workers from restructuring ¯rms were retired during those years by means of special
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legal provisions, which included front-loaded cash payments to compensate for the relatively small
(often: minimum) pension they would be receiving due to the early retirement mechanism. The
1975{1977 drop appears, instead, more as a sample bias or a reporting mistake. In Figure 6 we
look at the extent to which gender di®erences in wages are translated into gender di®erences in
the average pensions. Notice also here the two large swings, which are much more pronounced for
males than females. This data is also from the HLSS 1998 ¯les, and the anomalous oscillations
it displays are worthy of further investigation. Finally, Figure 8 reports the average annual real
revalorization by gender, showing that the initial bias in favor of women has been corrected in more
recent years.
Next we look at a particularly important instrument of the Spanish social security system,
the minimum pension. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, close to 70 percent of the Spanish
pensioners received a minimum pension; in 2001 this percentage was still a very sizeable 32 percent
of the stock of pensioners, with about 25 percent of new recipients starting out on a minimum
pension. As Figure 7 shows, the minimum pension has grown substantially during the last ¯fteen
years while the minimum wage has kept constant or even decreased, so much so that since year
2000 the minimum pension is higher than the minimum wage. The minimum pension has played a
very important role during the years 1975-2000 to sustain and improve the living conditions of the
bottom half of the Spanish elderly.
Averages, nevertheless, may notoriously hide substantial discrepancies, hence the following
Table 6 tries to measure the extent to which conditions of relative \poverty", variously de¯ned, have
become more or less common in the Spanish society during the same interval of time. Speci¯cally,
we look here at the fraction of Spanish households that is below a certain per capita income or
consumption level, where this is de¯ned to be equal to either 25% or 40% of the median income
or consumption among Spaniards that have less than 60 years of age. The overall impression is
in line with the previous optimistic assessment: the percentage of households below either of the
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two threshold lines is very small to start with, and rapidly and monotonically decreasing over time.
Extreme poverty (i.e. individuals below the 25% line) is practically negligible from a statistical
point of view, while poverty seems to be restricted to no more than 4-5%of the total number of
households.
To complete the overall survey of consumption and income measures, we report in Figures 10 to
18 the time trends of a few other measures of wellbeing: average social security bene¯ts, per capita
income among elderly and non, relative and absolute 4 poverty indexes among the elderly. In each
case the variable is computed and reported separately for two groups of individuals: those aged
60+ and and those aged 60-. For each measure we report both the absolute level and an index,
which is set at 100 in the ¯rst year of the sample period.
In the appendix our measures of per capita income and consumption are disaggregated further
to investigate the extent to which the presence/absence of a retired or elderly person in a household
a®ects income and consumption levels, and in which direction.
5.2 Measures of Health and Quality of Life
Objective measures point unanimously to a progressive and substantial improvement in the living
conditions of the average Spaniard since 1970, and of the average elderly in particular. To complete
the picture we report summary statistics describing subjective measures of welfare, in particular
assessment of own life satisfaction and health, as well as some elementary objective measures of the
latter. To compare the level of well being of elderly people to that of the average citizen, we report
separately measures of the self-assessed quality of life for the whole population and for people aged
55 or more.
Feelings of mediocrity have apparently been pervading the Spanish society since the early 1980s,
as the percentage of both those who declare themselves highly satis¯ed and those who declare
themselves not at all satis¯ed have been decreasing almost steadily. The tendency seems common
4The absolute poverty line corresponds to an income below 40% of the median 1985 income for the non-elderly.
20Table 6: Fraction of all households below poverty lines (PL).
Consumption Income
year Per capita OECD scale Per capita OECD scale
25% PL 40% PL 25% PL 40% PL 25% PL 40% PL 25% PL 40% PL
73 0.014 0.075 0.019 0.082 0.016 0.070 0.016 0.072
81 0.014 0.065 0.020 0.079 0.013 0.050 0.014 0.054
85 0.013 0.061 0.013 0.072 0.022 0.067 0.023 0.070
86 0.012 0.064 0.011 0.073 0.021 0.049 0.022 0.053
87 0.010 0.053 0.010 0.064 0.017 0.041 0.016 0.044
88 0.009 0.046 0.009 0.058 0.016 0.038 0.015 0.040
89 0.007 0.045 0.008 0.062 0.006 0.035 0.006 0.034
90 0.007 0.045 0.010 0.058 0.009 0.037 0.010 0.039
91 0.008 0.048 0.011 0.059 0.013 0.043 0.013 0.044
92 0.005 0.040 0.008 0.059 0.008 0.032 0.010 0.037
93 0.006 0.041 0.008 0.056 0.011 0.034 0.012 0.038
94 0.007 0.048 0.009 0.055 0.011 0.042 0.011 0.040
95 0.006 0.047 0.006 0.051 0.010 0.046 0.009 0.043
96 0.006 0.038 0.007 0.046 0.016 0.048 0.013 0.047
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27Table 7: Trends in life satisfaction and health.
Satisfaction % Fair+Bad Health Survival
Very Not Life Exp. Share Surv.
Year Group All Male Female at 55 at 75
1965 | | | | | | 21.95 52.98
1970 | | | | | | 22.69 55.82
1975 | | | | | | 23.43 58.67
1980 | | | | | | 24.17 61.52
1985 all 0.235 0.071 0.357 0.306 0.405 | |
1985 55+ 0.249 0.081 0.578 0.524 0.632 24.91 64.37
1986 all 0.263 0.058 0.345 0.304 0.382 | |
1986 55+ 0.262 0.061 0.557 0.519 0.587 25.06 64.94
1987 all 0.282 0.047 0.331 0.282 0.377 |- |
1987 55+ 0.277 0.055 0.560 0.503 0.605 25.21 65.51
1988 all 0.142 0.024 | | | | |
1988 55+ 0.140 0.032 | | | 25.36 66.07
1989 all 0.217 0.028 | | | |
1989 55+ 0.225 0.034 | | | 25.50 66.64
1990 all 0.240 0.032 | | | |
1990 55+ 0.229 0.052 | | | 25.65 67.21
1991 all 0.159 0.022 | | | |
1991 55+ 0.155 0.017 | | | 25.80 67.78
1992 all 0.203 0.043 | | | |
1992 55+ 0.203 0.051 | | | 25.95 68.35
1993 all 0.104 0.034 0.314 0.268 0.358 | |
1993 55+ 0.116 0.027 0.522 0.465 0.568 26.10 68.92
1994 all 0.100 0.045 0.374 0.334 0.412 | |
1994 55+ 0.107 0.058 0.680 0.625 0.725 26.25 69.49
1995 all 0.027 0.009 0.349 0.303 0.391 | |
1995 55+ 0.025 0.007 0.646 0.581 0.699 26.39 70.06
1996 all | | 0.329 0.291 0.364 | |
1996 55+ | | 0.640 0.578 0.689 26.54 70.63
1997 all 0.041 0.007 0.326 0.287 0.362 | |
1997 55+ 0.042 0.009 0.635 0.575 0.684 26.69 71.20
1998 all 0.051 0.016 0.325 0.287 0.359 | |
1998 55+ 0.053 0.017 0.630 0.572 0.677 26.84 71.77
1999 all 0.104 0.009 0.308 0.271 0.342 | |
1999 55+ 0.040 0.006 0.608 0.560 0.646 26.99 72.34
2000 all 0.121 0.009 0.312 0.274 0.346 27.14 72.91
2000 55+ 0.107 0.019 0.627 0.568 0.674 27.14 72.91
2001 all 0.100 0.006 0.323 0.287 0.356 27.28 73.48
2001 55+ 0.087 0.009 0.617 0.561 0.661 27.28 73.48
2002 all 0.042 0.005 | | | 27.43 74.05
2002 55+ 0.036 0.007 | | | 27.43 74.05
2003 55+ | | | | | 27.58 74.62
note: from 1985 to 1993: ES; 1994+ ECHP
28to all age groups, as the time series for the elderly closely tracks that for the population at large.
Notice that the subjective evaluation of health conditions also points to a bleak situation, as the
percentage of those who consider themselves to be in either fair or bad health (as opposed to good
or excellent) increases monotonically and dramatically for the whole sample period. Objective
measures of health, though, seem to provide a completely di®erent picture of the situation. Life
expectancy at 55 has increased from 22 to almost 28 years over the 1965-2003 period and the
(absolute) rate of improvement does not seem to have declined during the last decade: each ten
years of calendar time, 55+ years old Spaniards add 1.5 years to their life expectancy. Similarly,
the chances at birth of surviving until age 75 have dramatically increased from about even to the
current three quarters.
On a more methodological line, the dramatic discrepancy between objective and subjective
measures of health and living conditions should issue an important warning on the reliability
of polls or other \subjective" measures of economic and physical conditions. Quite clearly, as
these examples show, people seem to systematically report \feelings" either in a confused or a
strategic form. Even more startling is the fact that, when self evaluating health conditions, women
seem to be, at all ages, lot more pessimist than men: in our sample the percentage of those
reporting poor health conditions is systematically 8 to 10 points higher among women than among
men. Notoriously, women's life expectancy is, in Spain as everywhere else, substantially higher
than men's. In other words: beware of socio-psychological opinion polls, stick to the old revealed
preferences tradition that has served economists so well till now.
6 Simulated Bene¯ts
Spanish elderly seem to be doing better and better, their income has increased both in absolute
and relative terms, so have their consumption, health and life expectancy, while poverty seems to
be dramatically and steadily decreasing, and inequality remains stable at relatively low levels. We
ask then: what did bring about all this wellbeing? In particular, which legislative and regulatory
changes in the social security legislation, if any, account the most for the improvement in the living
conditions of Spanish elderly? As the data reported so far suggest, the average elderly Spaniard
is working a lot less than in the past, consuming a lot more, and living a longer and better life.
This may have certainly come from a sudden increase in the return to their accumulated life-time
savings but the data, see above Figure 3, have already told us that this cannot be the case. In fact,
the data show that the dramatic improvement in the per capita income of the elderly is basically
due to one and one source only: the social security bene¯ts. Hence, it is worth asking: which
legislative changes made bene¯ts per capita increase so much?
We will try to answer this by creating various series of simulated bene¯ts, obtained by trying
to \turn o®" some of the determinants of actual bene¯ts so as to concentrate on the impact
of legislative changes versus changes in the level of wages or in employment patterns. With this
methodology we hope to capture legislative variations in the system over time, and to separate them
from changes in the labor force and its characteristics. Ideally, what we would like to measure is
the impact that legislative and regulatory changes (i.e. changes in the formal rules) per-se have
had on per capita bene¯ts at every age from 60 years onward, for both males and females. It is not
clear, though, that this can be fully achieved in any meaningful way by means of the data available
to us.
Consider the following fact: the bene¯ts accruing to an individual with characteristics ! during
calendar year t are determined by two factors: the laws in place in year t and the characteristics !
29of the recipient, which include among other, age, sex and number of contributive years. The idea
of the simulated bene¯t approach, is to abstract from all di®erences in characteristics of recipients
and focus solely on variation in bene¯ts that arise from law changes. But, as individuals have
di®erent characteristics both before and after legislative changes are implemented, a given set of
law changes will have very di®erent e®ects on individual with di®erent characteristics. Ideally,
again, the simulated bene¯ts approach would take exactly the same person (but notice: which kind
of person?) and put him/her in every single birth cohort, and then compute his/her bene¯ts in
every single calendar year since this person turns 60, which would obviously vary with the birth
cohort. In this way, it is claimed, we would hold constant the personal characteristics, and any
bene¯ts variation that we saw over time or across birth cohorts would have to be due to law
changes. But, again, this is not completely true, and for two reasons. First, as we have already
said, because there are very many di®erent sets of individuals with di®erent personal characteristics
at any past date of birth or at any year in calendar time, and a given law change may increase
bene¯ts for type !1 between ages a and a0 while it decreases bene¯ts for type !2 during the same age
interval. Second, because any law change induces di®erent behavioral responses from individuals
with di®erent characteristics, and bene¯ts do depend also on behavioral responses as the latter
determine things such as, for example, the number of contributive years at the time of retirement.
6.1 Construction of simulated bene¯ts
We construct various simulated bene¯t measures. The ¯rst two are common to all chapters in this
volume. They are
² (SB1) Partially simulated bene¯ts, and
² (SB2) Fully simulated bene¯ts.
In order to construct the Partially simulated bene¯ts measure we proceed as follows:
1. We use either the 50 percentile of the Spanish wage distribution [OPTION B1A] constructed
from the 1995 Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (EES, the 5, 10, 25, 50 ,75, 90, 95 percentiles
of the distribution are shown in ¯gure 23), or the 25, 50 and 75 percentiles constructed from
covered wages by sex, age and year [OPTION B1B(25,50,75)] (Sources: new HLSS 1990 and
2004 ¯les.)
2. We correct the 50 percentile wage pro¯le with in°ation and use it to construct simulated
bene¯ts (SB) for each possible retirement age and calendar year since the beginning of the
sample period.
3. For each age a, we construct a simulated bene¯ts (SB) measure as a weighted average of
bene¯ts at any previous feasible retirement age (a) in each year (t), where the weights are




j=min age Bt Prt(Ret:)
In order to construct the Fully simulated bene¯ts, steps 1 and 2 are as above. Steps 3 and 4 only
di®er slightly since we use ¯xed retirement probabilities and participation levels. In both cases we
use either the 1995 wage distribution (OPTION SB2A) or the average covered wages by quantile
(OPTION SB2B (25,50,75, see ¯gure 26)).
In the analysis of the next section, apart from the set of simulated bene¯ts measures just de¯ned,
we also compute:
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² (SB3) Minimum bene¯ts entitlement, which may depend on age and marital status.
The minimum bene¯t variable at age a, SB3a; is constructed as:
SB3a = fma ¤ SB3a(m) + (1 ¡ fma) ¤ SB3a(nm)
where fma stands for the fraction of married at age a; m stands for married and nm for
nonmarried. Note that the minimum bene¯t varies with age (60{64 and 65+) and marital
status (married vs unmarried).
² (SSB) Finally, we construct various indicators of actual Social Security bene¯ts:
1. Mean of actual SS bene¯ts by cell.
2. 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of actual bene¯ts in order to use them for in respectively
the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of income and consumption.
3. Actual bene¯ts average for those below either the relative or the absolute income poverty
line (40 percent of the non-elderly median income in the current year {relative{, or in
year 1985 {absolute).
6.2 Description of Variation
Figures 24 and 25 describe, for men and women respectively, the variation of our measures of
simulated bene¯ts by year (¯rst row), cohort (second row) and age (third row). The ¯rst row
compares partial and fully simulated bene¯ts for options A and B (based, respectively, on the
pro¯les of actual wages and covered wages). The second row compares, for the same cases, the
same measures computed for various cohorts. Finally, the third row of graphs allows for comparisons
by age at which bene¯ts are received. Note ¯rst that there is no real di®erence between sexes, all
31variations are remarkably similar. The overall historical pattern is the same we already noticed
before when considering actual bene¯ts. The estimated bene¯ts according to age suggest a strong
increase in bene¯ts received as people become older, signaling a bias of the system in favor of the
very old. This, in our view, is probably due to the e®ect of early retirement and the penalization
it entails. Almost all the retirees in the age groups 60{65 are early retirees, who receive pension
bene¯ts up to 40% smaller than those accruing to people retiring at the age of 65 or older. The
cohort e®ect, line two, is also visible, with earlier cohorts treated overall better than the most recent
ones; this con¯rms the slow down in the growth rate of bene¯ts during the most recent years.
7 Estimating the Causal Relationship Between Programs and Well
Being
We carry out the analysis at two levels of data disaggregation: (L1) age-year-gender cells; and,
(L2) age-year-gender-education cells. For the ¯st level of analysis, all the bene¯t measures are
employed. However, for the second level, we restrict to B1B (Partial simulated bene¯ts) and B2B
(Fully simulated bene¯ts). Educational groups are de¯ned as: (Group 0) less than high school, and
(Group 1) high school and above. We assign the 25th percentile of the covered wages pro¯le to
group 0 (less than high school) and the 75th percentile of the covered wages pro¯le to educational
group 1. [See ¯gure 26 for an illustration]. Finally, inspection of the data reported in ¯gure 27
recommends carrying out the analysis for all individuals aged 60+.
7.1 Regressions for age-year-gender cells
Our main purpose is to identify the impact of Social Security bene¯ts (SSB) on wellbeing measures
(WB). Identi¯cation of the e®ect of SS bene¯t variables proceeds in three steps.
1. We estimate ¯rst stage regressions of actual Social Security bene¯t variables (mean, 10th,
50th, 90th, and poverty SS income), the corresponding simulated bene¯t concept (mean,
10th, 50th, and 90th), and other controls.
SSBatf = ±SBatf + X0
atf® + ¯a ¢ a + ¯y ¢ t + ¯fF + Z0
c° + uatf
where SSB denotes the corresponding actual Social Security bene¯t concept, SB the simu-
lated bene¯t concept, and u denotes an error term. The regression also controls for age (a),
calendar year (t), gender (F = 1, for female), and two sets of control variables:
² Zc: Predetermined (as of retirement) characteristics of the birth cohort,
² Xt: Mean outcomes of the non-elderly in that year, to capture time series e®ects (e.g.
in income equations, include average income of non-elderly)
2. In the second stage, for each measure of well-being (WB), we estimate reduced form mod-
els. More precisely, we regress wellbeing (WB) variables against simulated bene¯ts variables
(B) and the set of controls listed above:
WBatf = ±SBatf + X0
atf® + ¯a ¢ a + ¯y ¢ t + ¯fF + Z0
c° + vatf
where Bt denotes the bene¯t measure and v is an error term.
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363. In the third stage we estimate the relationship between wellbeing (WB) variables and actual
Social Security bene¯ts (SSB):
WBatf = ±SSBatf + X0
atf® + ¯a ¢ a + ¯y ¢ t + ¯fF + Z0
c° + vatf
However, in this case the estimation is carried out by instrumental variables (IV) using
simulated bene¯t variables (SB) as instruments for actual Social Security bene¯t variables.
The following table describes the mapping between wellbeing indicators, actual SS bene¯ts
and simulated bene¯ts.
Well-Being indicator actual SS bene¯t concept simulated bene¯t concept
Income, Consumption
Satis¯ed, unsatis¯ed average SS income median simulated bene¯ts
Good and Bad Health
Relative and absolute Average SS income
income and cons poverty for those below 10th percentile sim. ben.
10th per income and cons. poverty line
50th per income and cons. 50th percentile SS income median simulated bene¯ts
90th per income and cons. 90th percentile SS income 90th per. simulated bene¯ts
All three steps are carried out using simulated bene¯ts concepts SBjA, SBjB, j = 1;2). All
regressions are weighted by the cell size in the micro-data.
7.2 Regressions for age-year-gender-education cells
In a second round of regressions we collect individuals according to their educational status and
follow the same three steps described above (1st stage regressions, reduced form and instrumental
variables). However, in this case, since there is more variation in the data, we consider a richer set
of controls and include education, age and year dummies interacted with gender.
1. The ¯rst stage regressions is given by:
SSBatfe = ±SBatfe + ºa + ¯eE + dt + ¯fF + fF ¤ dtg + fF ¤ Eg + fa ¤ Fg + veatf
2. The reduced form regression is given by:
WBatfe = ±SBatfe + ºa + ¯eE + dt + ¯fF + fF ¤ dtg + fF ¤ Eg + fa ¤ Fg + veatf
3. The IV regression is given by:
WBatfe = ±SSBatfe + ºa + ¯eE + dt + ¯fF + fF ¤ dtg + fF ¤ Eg + fa ¤ Fg + veatf
In this case the actual bene¯t variable is instrumented by using partial simulated bene¯ts
(SB1B), or fully simulated bene¯ts (SB2B). In simulating bene¯ts for the highly educated
group we use in either SB1B or SB2B the 75th percentile of the covered wages pro¯le, while
for the less educated group we use the 25th percentile of covered wages.
Again, all regressions are weighted by the cell size in the micro-data.
377.3 Results for age-year-gender cell regressions
Table 8 reports the linear age and year regression results (¯rst stage, reduced form and IV) for
the bene¯t coe±cient ± when using bene¯t concepts SB1A (PS columns) and SB2A (FS columns).
simulated bene¯ts (SB1A and B2A). In all cases the results vary very little by simulation concept,
either partially simulated or fully simulated bene¯ts, so we comment them jointly.
The estimated coe±cient of the bene¯t variables has, in many cases, the correct sign but is not,
as a rule, very signi¯cant. For example, the reduced and IV coe±cients for the average income case
show the wrong sign but aren't signi¯cant. In case of consumption the corresponding coe±cient
while showing the correct sign are insigni¯cant. Also relevant is the evidence we obtain by quantile.
The IV coe±cient for the 10th quantile regressions of either income and consumption is small but
signi¯cant. They imply that a euro of Social Security bene¯ts translates into approximately 10
cents of euro of income and consumption respectively. The e®ect for the 50th quantile is very
di®erent since it is insigni¯cant for income and very signi¯cant for consumption. In the latter case
an euro of SS bene¯ts increases 20 cents of euro the level of consumption. Finally the e®ect for the
90th percentile has the correct sign but is insigni¯cant.
The e®ect of SS bene¯t on poverty is much clearer. An increase of 1000 euros in SS income,
decrease relative and absolute income poverty by one third. The e®ect in consumption poverty is
smaller but still important, since it reduces it around 25 percent. The e®ect of either satisfaction
or health variables has the correct sign and is signi¯cant except for the unsatis¯ed variable.
Table 9 reports the results from simular regression but using simulated bene¯t concepts B1B (PS
columns) and B2B (FS columns). Under the alternative simulated bene¯t concept the qualitative
picture remains the same. However, the signi¯cance of the coe±cients is greater because the
simulated data has, in this case greater variation. The consequences are evident: now the e®ect of
SS bene¯ts in the fraction of unsatis¯ed and the fraction with bad health is signi¯cant.
7.4 Results with educational groups
Here we do exactly the same, allowing to control for the educational group of the individual. Table
10 reports the regression results when using SB1B (columns labelled PS), SB2B (columns labelled
FS) concepts.
As one would have expected, the ¯t of the model is, as a rule, substantially better than in
the case where educational groups are not considered; this is particularly true for income and
consumption regressions. For instance, an euro of SS bene¯ts translates into 0.80 euros of average
income. The e®ect is also very substantial for the 10th and 90th percentile of income (0.6 and 1.82
when PS bene¯ts is used as instrument for actual SS bene¯ts, respectively). Results for average
or median consumption are much more modest (around 0.20). Finally, the e®ect for the 90th
percentile of consumption are very important since an euro of SS bene¯ts translates into between
0.75 (PS) and 1 (FS) euro of consumption.
Poverty results are even stronger than they were in the previous tables. In this case, 1000
extra euros of SS income practically eliminate income poverty and reduces by more than a third
(depending on the speci¯cation) consumption poverty. After adding more variation to the analysis
the e®ect of bene¯ts in satisfaction turns now signi¯cant. The coe±cients on unsatis¯ed and health
variables remain little or no signi¯cant.
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7.5 Results when considering minimum bene¯ts as a bene¯t measure
In the Spanish case, legislated minimum bene¯ts constitute a powerful tool for redistributing income
toward a certain subset of the elderly people. In this subsection we brie°y evaluate their explanatory
power with respect to well-being measures.
In Table 11 we present the result of ¯tting well-being indicators as a function of the minimum
pension (bene¯t measure SB3) and of the average annual non-contributive pension per individual
aged 65+, these being the two key policy tools used for redistributing income toward the elderly
poor in Spain. The presence of a non-negligible non-contributive pension, introduced in 1991, helps
explaining the change in income and consumption levels of the poorest elderly that have occurred
during the 1990s. Figure 28 illustrates the relevance of this program since its inception; it reports
the fraction of 65+ having a non-contributive pension, and the average annual bene¯t received by
each individual aged 65+.
As in the previous tables, most of the coe±cients are signi¯cant, especially when considering age
and year dummies. The minimum pension works particularly well in explaining the 10th percentile
of income, consumption, and poverty measures. Again, also in this case the explanatory variable
does a poor job in explaining satisfaction indices and, to a lesser extent, health variables. The
inclusion of the average annual non-contributive bene¯t per older individual improves the ¯t of all
models.
8 Conclusions
The Spanish pension system has apparently not su®ered big changes in the period 1975-2000. Only
the changes in the pension formula are of some relevance. In fact, the most important changes in the
system have been the increase in the generosity of the minimum pension and survival pension, and
the introduction of non-contributive pension. Minimum pension supplements and non-contributive
pension (mostly for women) represent well above 10 percent of pension expenditure, which helps
understand the continuous improvement of the Spanish elderly. However, still we are able to ¯nd
39Table 8: Well-being indicators vs bene¯ts regressions. Age-gender-year cells. Simulated bene¯t
concepts: SB1A (PS) and SB2A (FS). Spain: ages 60-80+ (I). Linear age and year speci¯cation
with cohort controls.
Mean of # First Stage Reduced Form IV
age 60* dep. obs PS FS PS FS PS FS
Mean SS income 4196.0 756 0.2835 0.3519 | | | |
s.e. 0.0084 0.0093 | | | |
Rel Pov SS inc 1322.2 655 0.1387 0.1451 | | | |
s.e. 0.0178 0.0194 | | | |
Abs Pov SS inc 754.5 499 0.1247 0.1099 | | | |
s.e. 0.0203 0.0231 | | | |
10
th Pct SS income 1315.0 756 0.3818 0.4527 | | | |
s.e. 0.0200 0.0226 | | | |
50
th Pct SS income 3751.0 756 0.2930 0.3565 | | | |
s.e. 0.0088 0.0103 | | | |
90
th Pct SS income 7423.9 756 0.2042 0.2361 | | | |
s.e. 0.0106 0.0123 | | | |
Income 7163.3 756 | | -0.0092 0.0060 -0.0324 0.0172
s.e. | | 0.0104 0.0116 0.0371 0.0331
Rel. Inc. poverty
a 3134.2 756 | | -0.4807 -0.6029 -1.2591 -1.3315
s.e. | | 0.0709 0.0740 0.1826 0.1597
Abs. Inc. poverty
a 1657.6 756 | | -0.3559 -0.3908 -0.9324 -0.8635
s.e. | | 0.0495 0.0499 0.1252 0.1090
10
th income 3419.1 756 | | 0.0769 0.1135 0.2015 0.2506
s.e. | | 0.0123 0.0116 0.0315 0.0269
50
th income 6167.7 756 | | -0.0024 0.0044 -0.0081 0.0123
s.e. | | 0.0105 0.0111 0.0359 0.0313
90
th income 11819 756 | | -0.0266 -0.0128 -0.1313 -0.0547
s.e. | | 0.0162 0.0180 0.0821 0.0777
Consumption 7345.3 630 | | 0.0056 0.0218 0.0194 0.0618
s.e. | | 0.0110 0.0135 0.0380 0.0384
Rel. cons.poverty
a 6966.5 630 | | -0.1845 -0.3990 -0.4795 -0.9097
s.e. | | 0.1050 0.1100 0.2753 0.2606
Abs. cons.poverty
a 4786.9 630 | | -0.1119 -0.3204 -0.2915 -0.7328
s.e. | | 0.0797 0.0783 0.2075 0.1868
10
th consumption 3065.5 756 | | 0.0254 0.0388 0.0662 0.0888
s.e. | | 0.0110 0.0120 0.0289 0.0280
50
th consumption 6101.1 756 | | 0.0075 0.0204 0.0252 0.0569
s.e. | | 0.0085 0.0104 0.0286 0.0293
90
th consumption 12711 756 | | 0.0036 0.0213 0.0170 0.0861
s.e. | | 0.0183 0.0204 0.0859 0.0822
Satis¯ed
a 15596 756 | | 0.7981 0.7324 2.5379 2.0152
s.e. | | 0.2284 0.2363 0.6808 0.6292
Unsatis¯ed
a 2620.5 756 | | -0.0551 -0.0328 -0.0799 -0.0135
s.e. | | 0.0694 0.0733 0.2443 0.2307
God health
a 36566 504 | | -0.3535 -0.3549 -0.9726 -0.9060
s.e. | | 0.2167 0.2359 0.5959 0.5994
Bad health
a 24618 504 | | -0.3855 -0.4139 -1.0620 -1.0584
s.e. | | 0.1722 0.1881 0.4747 0.4799
Cohort controls: marital status, gender and education distributions
Standard errors are reported below coe±cients. (a) in 10
5 units
40Table 9: Well-being indicators vs bene¯ts regressions. Age-gender-year cells. Simulated bene¯t
concept: SB1B (PS) and SB2B (FS). Spain: ages 60-80+ (I). Linear age and year speci¯cation
with cohort controls.
Mean of # First Stage Reduced Form IV
age 60* dep. obs PS FS PS FS PS FS
Mean SS income 4196.0 756 0.4268 0.3740 | | | |
s.e. 0.0149 0.0144 | | | |
Rel Pov SS inc 1322.2 655 0.1162 0.0994 | | | |
s.e. 0.0161 0.0151 | | | |
Abs Pov SS inc 754.5 499 0.0992 0.0732 | | | |
s.e. 0.0188 0.0174 | | | |
10
th Pct SS income 1315.0 756 0.3832 0.3495 | | | |
s.e. 0.0173 0.0166 | | | |
50
th Pct SS income 3751.0 756 0.4368 0.3851 | | | |
s.e. 0.0164 0.0161 | | | |
90
th Pct SS income 7423.9 756 0.2912 0.2584 | | | |
s.e. 0.0165 0.0162 | | | |
Income 7163.3 756 | | 0.0240 0.0253 0.0562 0.0679
s.e. | | 0.0153 0.0144 0.0357 0.0386
Rel. Inc. poverty
a 3134.2 756 | | -0.5451 -0.5152 -1.4205 -1.4718
s.e. | | 0.0636 0.0605 0.1665 0.1707
Abs. Inc. poverty
a 1657.6 756 | | -0.3530 -0.3119 -0.9214 -0.8922
s.e. | | 0.0430 0.0397 0.1130 0.1126
10
th income 3419.1 756 | | 0.0989 0.0997 0.2580 0.2851
s.e. | | 0.0103 0.0089 0.0281 0.0274
50
th income 6167.7 756 | | 0.0176 0.0126 0.0402 0.0328
s.e. | | 0.0148 0.0127 0.0341 0.0333
90
th income 11819 756 | | -0.0154 -0.0096 -0.0534 -0.0376
s.e. | | 0.0243 0.0236 0.0851 0.0929
Consumption 7345.3 630 | | 0.0408 0.0436 0.0963 0.1161
s.e. | | 0.0162 0.0152 0.0382 0.0406
Rel. cons.poverty
a 6966.5 630 | | -0.2958 -0.3281 -0.7946 -0.9626
s.e. | | 0.0949 0.0908 0.2607 0.2744
Abs. cons.poverty
a 4786.9 630 | | -0.2315 -0.2746 -0.6234 -0.8080
s.e. | | 0.0693 0.0642 0.1902 0.1954
10
th consumption 3065.5 756 | | 0.0279 0.0286 0.0751 0.0842
s.e. | | 0.0100 0.0094 0.0271 0.0277
50
th consumption 6101.1 756 | | 0.0366 0.0407 0.0837 0.1041
s.e. | | 0.0135 0.0126 0.0315 0.0331
90
th consumption 12711 756 | | 0.0356 0.0484 0.1179 0.1763
s.e. | | 0.0262 0.0251 0.0861 0.0903
Satis¯ed
a 15596 756 | | 0.8952 0.2030 2.1449 0.6272
s.e. | | 0.4361 0.3946 1.0289 1.1022
Unsatis¯ed
a 2620.5 756 | | -0.7283 -0.5120 -1.7688 -1.5189
s.e. | | 0.3512 0.3070 0.8609 0.8439
God health
a 36566 504 | | -0.2974 -0.3726 -0.5682 -0.8019
s.e. | | 0.3447 0.3462 0.6477 0.7251
Bad health
a 24618 504 | | -0.8693 -0.6632 -1.6666 -1.4313
s.e. | | 0.2954 0.2621 0.5858 0.5844
Cohort controls: marital status, gender and education distributions
Standard errors are reported below coe±cients. (a) in 10
5 units
41Table 10: Well-being indicators vs bene¯ts regressions. Age-year-gender-education cells. Bene¯ts
simulated from average covered wages by age-gender-year-education. Simulated bene¯t concepts:
SB1B (PS) and SB2B (FS). Spain: ages 60-80+ (I). age, year and education interactions with
cohort controls.
Mean of # First Stage Reduced Form IV
age 60* dep. obs PS FS PS FS PS FS
Mean SS income 5213.0 1430 0.4213 0.3021 | | | |
s.e. 0.0358 0.0253 | | | |
Rel Pov SS inc 1279.1 727 0.0420 0.0342 | | | |
s.e. 0.0360 0.0235 | | | |
Abs Pov SS inc 706.4 515 0.0389 0.0315 | | | |
s.e. 0.0424 0.0291 | | | |
10
th Pct SS income 1633.4 1430 0.2174 0.2650 | | | |
s.e. 0.0314 0.0215 | | | |
50
th Pct SS income 4621.1 1430 0.4743 0.3466 | | | |
s.e. 0.0382 0.0269 | | | |
90
th Pct SS income 9659.7 1430 0.0939 0.0656 | | | |
s.e. 0.0373 0.0294 | | | |
Income 9434.2 1430 | | 0.3431 0.2249 0.8145 0.7446
s.e. | | 0.0473 0.0340 0.0906 0.0913
Rel. Inc. poverty
a 2260.2 1430 | | -0.5392 -0.6253 -2.5907 -2.4544
s.e. | | 0.1560 0.1128 0.7397 0.4380
Abs. Inc. poverty
a 1119.1 1430 | | -0.4560 -0.3761 -2.0957 -1.4180
s.e. | | 0.0994 0.0682 0.5045 0.2709
10
th income 4591.1 1430 | | 0.1333 0.1302 0.6133 0.4915
s.e. | | 0.0256 0.0176 0.1236 0.0681
50
th income 8448.6 1430 | | 0.1867 0.1154 0.3936 0.3328
s.e. | | 0.0408 0.0285 0.0765 0.0737
90
th income 16088 1430 | | 0.1716 0.1008 1.8271 1.5373
s.e. | | 0.0683 0.0518 0.8435 0.8600
Consumption 8835.6 1179 | | 0.1097 0.0924 0.1799 0.2164
s.e. | | 0.0418 0.0306 0.0705 0.0734
Rel. cons.poverty
a 4670.6 1179 | | -0.2196 -0.4346 -0.7603 -1.3516
s.e. | | 0.2703 0.1982 0.9856 0.6574
Abs. cons.poverty
a 3127.4 1179 | | -0.4041 -0.5107 -1.4052 -1.5917
s.e. | | 0.2435 0.1718 0.9370 0.5864
10
th consumption 3926.7 1179 | | -0.0130 0.0187 -0.0496 0.0538
s.e. | | 0.0254 0.0188 0.0863 0.0600
50
th consumption 7489.3 1179 | | 0.0996 0.0991 0.1548 0.2086
s.e. | | 0.0332 0.0252 0.0547 0.0576
90
th consumption 15406 1179 | | 0.1378 0.1190 0.7570 1.0052
s.e. | | 0.0706 0.0565 0.4430 0.5964
Satis¯ed
a 15512. 1387 | | -1.4502 -1.8476 -3.0778 -6.2295
s.e. | | 0.6685 0.5025 1.6683 1.9820
Unsatis¯ed
a 2521.4 1387 | | -0.2001 0.0547 -0.6848 -0.1771
s.e. | | 0.2753 0.2075 0.6966 0.7385
God health
a 42086. 666 | | -0.0767 -2.1577 -0.5157 -11.1284
s.e. | | 1.1914 0.8857 3.5396 7.2493
Bad health
a 21897. 666 | | -1.7998 0.1163 -5.3532 0.6071
s.e. | | 1.1009 0.8333 4.3102 4.2293
Cohort controls: marital status, gender and education distributions
Standard errors are reported below coe±cients. (a) in 10
5 units
42Table 11: Well-being indicators vs bene¯ts regressions. Age-gender-year cells. Simulated bene¯t
concepts: minimum pension entitlement (SB3), and average non-contributive bene¯t per elder
person. Spain: ages 60-80+. Linear age and year speci¯cation with cohort controls.
Mean of # First Stage Reduced Form IV
age 60* dep. obs
Mean SS income 4196.0 756 1.5232 || ||
s.e. 0.0659 || ||
Rel Pov SS inc 1322.2 655 0.4737 || ||
s.e. 0.0622 || ||
Abs Pov SS inc 754.5 499 0.3760 || ||
s.e. 0.0739 || ||
10
th Pct SS income 1315.0 756 1.2169 || ||
s.e. 0.0733 || ||
50
th Pct SS income 3751.0 756 1.4971 || ||
s.e. 0.0693 || ||
90
th Pct SS income 7423.9 756 1.6068 || ||
s.e. 0.1101 || ||
Income 7163.3 756 || 0.0619 0.0402
s.e. || 0.0691 0.0444
Rel. Inc. poverty
a 3134.2 756 || -1.0163 -0.8155
s.e. || 0.2459 0.1842
Abs. Inc. poverty
a 1657.6 756 || -0.6348 -0.5088
s.e. || 0.1688 0.1291
10
th income 3419.1 756 || 0.2191 0.1750
s.e. || 0.0424 0.0326
50
th income 6167.7 756 || 0.0628 0.0409
s.e. || 0.0602 0.0390
90
th income 11819 756 || 0.0155 0.0099
s.e. || 0.1557 0.0990
Consumption 7345.3 630 || 0.0889 0.0597
s.e. || 0.0762 0.0510
Rel. cons.poverty
a 6966.5 630 || -0.5773 -0.4777
s.e. || 0.3276 0.2723
Abs. cons.poverty
a 4786.9 630 || -0.3254 -0.2705
s.e. || 0.2562 0.2123
10
th consumption 3065.5 756 || 0.1153 0.0960
s.e. || 0.0380 0.0323
50
th consumption 6101.1 756 || 0.1113 0.0755
s.e. || 0.0555 0.0378
90
th consumption 12711 756 || 0.0107 0.0067
s.e. || 0.1642 0.1022
Satis¯ed
a 15596 756 || 2.9272 1.2817
s.e. || 1.9807 1.2169
Unsatis¯ed
a 2620.5 756 || -1.6189 -0.8307
s.e. || 0.8754 0.5471
God health
a 36566 504 || -1.7785 -1.0965
s.e. || 1.5909 0.9717
Bad health
a 24618 504 || -3.3721 -2.0790
s.e. || 1.0986 0.6866
Cohort controls: marital status, gender and education distributions
Standard errors are reported below coe±cients. (a) in 10
5 units
43sizeable e®ect of SS bene¯t variables on income, consumption and poverty measures. Given the
above it should not cause any surprise that the clearer results are found for the 10th percentile and
poverty measures. Results for satisfaction and health variable, while showing the correct sign are
not, as a rule, signi¯cant.
9 Conclusions
Apparently, the Spanish pension system has not witnessed any big change during the period 1985-
2000. Further, since 1975, only modi¯cations of the pension formula are of some relevance. In fact,
the most important changes in the system have been the increase in the generosity of the minimum
pension and survival pension, and the introduction of non-contributive pension. Minimum pension
supplements and non-contributive pension (mostly for women) represent well above 10 percent of
pension expenditure, which helps understand the continuous improvement of the Spanish elderly.
In our econometric analysis we are able to ¯nd sizeable e®ects of the SS bene¯t variables on
income, consumption and poverty measures for the Spanish elderly. Not surprisingly, in light of our
earlier discussion, the clearer and stronger results are found for individuals in the 10th percentile
and for poverty measures. When measures of personal satisfaction and health conditions are on
the left hand side the estimated coe±cients, while showing the correct sign, are not, as a rule,
statistically signi¯cant.
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A Data and Variables
In this section we de¯ne the variables that have been employed in the speci¯cation of the reduced
form probit. The data source is the HLSS, unless we state otherwise.
Data Sources
European Community Household Panel. The ECHP is a PSID-like survey which started in 1994 and
ends with the 2001 wave. The sample size for Spain is over +7000 households (+17800 individuals).
Budget surveys:
Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares: The EPF is a cross-sectional household budget survey
carried out by INE in 1973-74, 1980-81 and 1990-91, with reference to income (classi¯ed by sources),
consumption expenditure, and dwelling characteristics in the previous calendar year. The 1990-91
sample contains 21,155 households and 72,123 persons (56582 of them 16+).
Encuesta continua de presupuestos familiares (Household budget Continuous Survey): This is
a rotating household survey carried out quarterly by INE since 1985. It collects data on income,
consumption and personal characteristic for about 3,000 households. One eight of the sample is
45replaced at each rotation. The Household Budget Continuous Survey, started by INE in January
1985, provides quarterly and annual information on the origin and amount of households incomes,
and the way they are used in several consumption expenditures. We dispose of data for the 1985-96
period. The ECPF 1997, started in the second quarter of 1997, replaces both the ECPF 1985 and
the EPF. The objectives of the new survey are the sum of those of the two surveys that the new
ECPF replaces.
EPA: A quarterly CPS-like survey of roughly 60,000 Spanish households. It contains fairly
detailed information on labor force status, education and family background variables but no infor-
mation on wages and income. Publicly released cross-sectional ¯les are available from 1976 onward.
Starting with 1987, INE also releases the so called Encuesta de Poblaci¶ on Activa Enlazada or EPAL,
which is the panel version of EPA obtained by exploiting the rotating cross-section nature of the
origin al survey. It contains fewer variables than EPA, but it permits to follow individuals for up
to 6 consecutive quarters.
Eurobarometer (EB): An annual pan-EUropean survey on Social and Economic issues. The
survey for Spain started in 1985, and has been running since them. We dispose of data on the
1985{2002.
Encuesta Nacional de Salud (ENS): 1987-1993-1995-1997-2001. Centro de Investigaciones
Sociol¶ ogicas.
Bene¯t ¯le form Labor Histories (from the HLSS sample): For each individual in
the HLSS (see Boldrin et al, 2004, for a description) ¯le who has received some bene¯ts at any
point in time, we know most of the information that the SS administration uses to compute the
monthly bene¯ts to be paid. In particular, we know the initial and current pension, the bene¯t base
(base reguladora), the number of contributive years, current integration to the minimum pension
(complementos por el m¶ ³nimo), the date of claiming, the date of award, the type of bene¯ts, etcetera.
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